

June 22

Real goals w.r.t. [not, SVN, but] US actions in SVN:

1) Attitudes of allies/neutral/ennies, esp. Asian

(Worst impact: quick sell-out

quick defeat

quick political collapse

Best impact: 1. quick success

2. Political stability and steady progress, with

1. Big successes, no defeats

2. Absence of big defeats

Current: Worsening of our relations with allied

publics — which must worsen relations with

govs, over time. If prolonged, increased risk of specific, important set-backs in relations:

Okunawa, Japan Defense Security Treaty; Indian bomb... UK

trouble.

Recent hopes:
6. Can't USG ~~they~~? Eventual success — or at least, stability (Quat!) + steady improvement — will wash out current bad effects. But:

a) Neither outcome seems imminent

b) Meanwhile, risk of serious, hard-to-reverse losses

c) As probability of achieving "success" in next several years decreases, need increases to make sure ensure that basic US goals are safeguarded by means other than success in SVN. I.e., important that we get maximum credit — and minimum demerits and political retaliation — from "the way we played the game."

[Having a goal; resolution; honesty; deliberate, not trigger-happy ... indication that we take as important those considerations that our observers take as important [US public — most not sympathetic to beach-in — and many publics.]

(Earlier, inhibition to satisfying critics has been fear that this would be counter-productive, by jeopardizing stability — effect on SVN — or success — effect on SVN.)